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Abstract     JEL # J6
We explore determinants of job reallocation and the implications for employment change and
average  job tenure in this paper. A model which associates technological advances with the
process  of economic growth is analysed and extended.  A consequence of this model is that
innovation   leads to the creation of new jobs and the destruction of older jobs exhibiting obsolete
technology.   Data on average job tenure within workplaces and gross job flows across workplaces
in  Australia are constructed by us from a single panel of workplace data and examined. Substantial
simultaneous  job creation and destruction are found in a year of strong job growth, suggesting
that  workplace heterogeneity is an important feature of the Australian labour market. The
predictions  generated from the theoretical model are examined with the data for job flows and
average job tenure. Our results support the key features of the model.
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Responsibility for any mistakes or omissions is entirely our own. 2
1This  paper is based on our paper ‘Job reallocation: theory and workplace evidence.’ Centre for Economic
Performance Discussion Paper No. 360, July 1997. 
I.  Introduction
The  empirical reality that the labour market is characterised by continuous flows of workers
through  jobs, across employment states and in and out of the labour force is now well
documented  for many countries (OECD 1994). In this paper
1 we concentrate on the flow of
workers  in and out of jobs as reflected in measurements of job creation and job destruction in the
workplace  (Davis and Haltiwanger 1990, 1992 and 1995, Davis  et al 1996). Descriptive empirical
studies of job flows are rarer than those of worker flows, although there is a study of
manufacturing  in Australia using disaggregated industry sector data (Borland 1996) and a limited
number  of  studies for other countries are available (Contini and Revelli 1992, and CEPR 1995).
Some  multivariate empirical analyses of job flows have also been carried out resulting in a limited
number  of stylised facts, for example, employment change is associated: asymmetrically with
positive  and negative firm-specific demand shocks; with firm size and age; with the extent of
product  market competition; and with different industry groups (Blanchflower and Burgess 1996,
and Davis  et al 1996).
Papers  which attempt a theoretical explanation of gross job flows in the labour market are
even  fewer in number. Amongst the most important of these papers is the partial equilibrium
approach of Caballero and Hammour (1994) and the  general equilibrium explanations provided
by  Aghion and Howitt (1994), Mortensen and Pissarides (1995) and Caballero and Hammour
(1996). These papers all rely on economic growth resulting in a  process of creative destruction
which generates reallocation in the labour market.
A flexible theoretical model is needed to assess the relative importance of the above
stylised  facts in order to give them structural interpretations. A key feature of such a model is that
it  should allow the firm to control hiring of new workers and firing of existing workers separately.
This  will allow for the possibility of asymmetric behaviour when looking at the net change in
employment.  We employ the Caballero and Hammour (1994) model to form the core of our
model  structure. However, as we require a model capable of capturing a much wider range of
structural  characteristics than Caballero and Hammour (1994) consider, we extend it in a number
of  directions and discuss the empirical importance of each of these extensions. We can also
consider  the implied effects of the predicted job reallocation  for average tenure levels in the3
workplace.
We test the predictions of the model with respect to differences in job reallocation and
average  job tenure across workplaces using data generated by the Australian Workplace Industrial
Relations  Survey 1989 (AWIRS) from some 2000 workplaces. This data source provides
important information on total job movements across workplaces in a year of substantial
employment  growth in Australia (the Australian Bureau of Statistics, ABS, measure of total
employment  growth was 5.6% for the year), allowing for the calculation of gross job flows.
AWIRS  respondents also provided information on a range of topics, resulting in a rich source of
additional information used to test the predictions generated from the theoretical model.
In  section 2 of the paper we consider the creative destruction models discussed above and
develop  a range of hypotheses we wish to explore empirically. Calculations of the gross job flows
and  a comparison of the size of these flows in the Australian labour market with respect to studies
for  other countries are discussed in section 3. The predictions of the model using our calculations
of  job reallocation rates and average job tenure are investigated in section 4 of the paper.
Conclusions  and suggestions for further work are presented in the fifth, and final, section of the
paper.
II.  Modelling job flows
Caballero  and Hammour (1994) argue that  the processes of  job creation and destruction are
profit  maximising responses of firms facing continuously advancing technology and exogenous
changes  in the demand for their output. Firms are assumed to introduce new technology by
creating a new production unit (a new job) which is a bonding of a  suitable worker, capital and
state-of-the-art  technology.  New workers are more productive and output will be accordingly
higher.  Once created, the technological level of a job is fixed, consequently a  gap between the
worker’s productivity and that of new employees emerges over time.  If firms do not introduce
new jobs, their production processes  will eventually become outdated as the skills of the longer
tenured  members of the labour force become relatively obsolete. When a recession hits, the
derived  demand for the firm’s employees falls. The firm can reduce the size of its labour force by
either  decreasing  job creation or increasing job destruction. If it adjusts entirely via less creation,
the  incumbent employees are, at least partially, insulated from the recession. The course chosen
by  the firm will depend on the nature of the costs involved in creation and the necessity to smooth4
this flow over time
Following  Caballero and Hammour (1994), firms combine labour and capital in fixed
proportions  to create a new productive unit (a new job) which they endow with the latest
technology.  The exogenous continuous technological progress is such that the productivity of new
units  grows at a positive rate  ã throughout time  t.  Once created, however, technology is embodied
and the productive unit will produce a constant flow of output  A(t0) over  its lifetime, from time
period   t0.  At any particular point in time  t, there  will be a distribution  f(a,t) of jobs of ages  a,  such
that  0 #  a # am(t) and  am(t) is the  age of the oldest job still in existence. Aggregating across jobs
at  any time provides total industry employment (of labour or capital stock in operation)  N(t) =










There  is a positive constant attrition rate  ä which is exogenous. At any time  t the number
of jobs that have survived for  a years is given by  
f(a,t) = f(0,t-a)exp
-äa ,  0<a#am(t).  (2)
Differentiating  N(t) over time, and allowing for (2), provides the fundamental equation for
employment growth:
(A) 0 N( t) ’f( 0 , t) &( f( am( t) , t) [ 1 & 0 am( t) ] %ä N( t) )
The  first term in equation (A) is the flow of creation of production units,  f(0,t).  The second term
is  the total flow of destruction which  consists of three parts: units  have reached their f( am( t) , t)
obsolescence  age ( am);  changes in  am over time lead to units  being destroyed; &( f( am( t) , t) 0 am( t) )
and   äN(t)  units are retired due to attrition. The first two components of the destruction flow can
be considered as endogenous  flows.  The third component  äN(t) is exogenous. Normalising the
creation  flow and the total destruction flow by  N(t) provides the job creation and job destruction
rates, respectively. Average tenure in the firm across all units at a point in time  t is:
average tenure  ’m
f( am, t)
f( 0 , t)
a( t) . df( a, t)
N( t)
It will be positively affected by  am(t) and negatively by  f(0,t).5
2To  find (7), solve (4) after substituting  P(s)A(t-a) -1 for  ð(s,t) and expanding, remembering  that in steady state
T(t)=am(t)=am
* , that prices are falling at the rate  ã and  technology between  a=0  and  a=am
* will have risen by
exp(ãam
*).
3Substitute  for Q t  in equation (6) making use of equation (1) and that in steady state  f(a,t) =  f
*(a) for all t, so  f
*(a)
=  f
*(0)exp(-äa), prices and technology are treated similarly as when solving for (7). 
There may  be a cost  c  = c(f(0,t)) involved in creating a job. (We will return to consider
some implications of  creation  costs later.) If we assume free entry in the industry, the firm will
equate  the creation cost to the discounted value of the expected profit flow generated by the job
over  its lifetime. If the operating costs of the job are set at 1, then the profits  ð generated at time
t by a production unit of age  a are  ð(a,t) = P(t)A(t-a)-1  where  P(t) is  the price of a unit of output
and  1 denotes the operating costs of a production unit. Let  T(t) be the maximum life of a
production unit created at time  t, with perfect foresight
am[t+T(t)] = T(t) (3)
The free entry condition at any time  t is




ð ( s&t, t) exp &( r%ä ) ( s&t) ds
where   r>0  is the interest rate (exogenously given). A production unit is destroyed when its profits
reach zero. Thus,  am(t) satisfies
P(t)A(t-am(t)) = 1 (5)
A unit elastic demand function is assumed with   being total spending on industry output D( t)
(6) P( t) Q( t) ’D( t)

















and the creation flow is
3
(8)








When the creation cost is constant  (independent of the creation flow),  am
* can be found
from  (7). This value for  am
* can then be incorporated into (8) to find  the creation flow given the
level of demand. These analytical solutions are not very informative, however, we can easily6
4By  providing values for the interest rate ( r),  the attrition rate ( ä),  the rate of technological growth ( ã)  and the
creation cost ( c).
5The  values for these parameters are set equal to the values chosen by Caballero and Hammour (1994) for
comparisons sake.
6If    ct(f(0,t)) = 0 and the parameters are set equal to that discussed above, a shift in demand from 0.5 to 1 to 2 has
no  impact on the redundancy age (it remains at 7.22 years) whilst the creation flow increases from 10% to 20.1%
to 40.2%.
substitute  in values for the parameters
4 and obtain calibrated  solutions. For example, if we assume
that  r=0.065,   ä=0.15,   ã=0.028  and  c=0.5, we find  am
* from (7) to be 7.3 years, substituting this
value  into (8) and assuming that  =1 provides a creation flow  of 20.1% per annum.
5  Outside ¯ D
of  steady state, providing  c’(f(0,t))=0,  the system retains its recursive property so that if we
double  the cost of creation to c=1,  ceteris paribus,  we find   am
* increases to 11 years and creation
flow  falls to 15.2%. If the creation cost is allowed to vary with  the creation flow  c’(f(0,t))>0,  the
system  must be solved simultaneously. Nevertheless, the path  {f(0,t),  am(t), T(t), P(t), Q(t)} t$0
satisfying equations (2), (A) and  (1) to (6) for all  t$0,  given an initial density of  f(a,0), a>0, of
production units provides an equilibrium for this industry and determines the right-hand  side of
equation (A) for employment change.
Caballero  and Hammour (1994) go on to explore the implications of demand shocks for
their  model over the longer run (over phases of the business cycle between 1972 and 1984). They
provide  empirical evidence from US data which supports an asymmetric response of job creation
and  destruction to output shocks. In this paper we are more interested in the implications of the
model  for employment changes across a single time period and for expected average job tenure.
In  particular, we will present an empirical investigation of equation (A) above, the dynamic
equation  for employment. To do this successfully, however, we need to develop the structure of
the model to incorporate a number of features which may be of empirical importance.
Demand shocks and creation costs
When  industry demand  D(t) falls, the firm can either reduce the flow of creation of new jobs  f(0,t)
or it can increase the endogenous destruction flow (by reducing the age at which redundancy
occurs,   am(t)).  If the firm fully insulates incumbents by adjusting entirely through a fall in creation,
the  firm will have to undergo more rapid creation in future time periods to maintain a competitive
level  of productivity. If there is no association between the costs of creation and the extent of the
creation  flow,  ct(f(0,t)) = 0, then the firm will indeed fully insulate
6 in the recession thereby7
7If we compare the cases where c 0=0.4 and c 1=0.5 with c 0=0.4 and  c 1=0.95,  we find values for  am
* and   f(0,t) of 
7.2, 20.9% and  7.9, 18.9% respectively.
8If  we consider the case where c 0=0.4  and c 1=0.5,  with other parameters remaining constant except for D, we find
D=0.5 associated with  am
* = 6.8 and   f(0,t)=10.5%, at  D=1    am
* = 7.2 and   f(0,t)=20.9% and at D=2   am
* = 7.95
and   f(0,t)=37.6%. 
temporarily  saving itself the set up costs involved in creation,  c.  Thus the firm will lower
employment  by taking on fewer new hires. Since the retirement age is not changing, the expected
job  tenure of an individual remains the same, however, if the firm lowers the creation flow the
average job tenure in the workplace will rise  ceteris paribus.
It  is quite possible, however, that there is a positive relationship between the creation rate
and  the costs of creation such that  ct(q)>0.  For example, attracting new employees requires
successful  matching and there may be diminishing returns in the matching function, there may also
limits  to the resources available for the training of suitable applicants, similarly the availability of
capital  needed to bond with labour in the new job may be limited in any time period. Consider the
case where creation  costs are linear and of the form  c=c0+c1  f(0,t),   then in general, holding  c0
constant and increasing  c1 has the effect  of raising  am
*  whilst lowering  f(0,t).
7 The stronger the
relationship  between the size of the creation flow and the costs of creation, the smaller the
insulation  effect will be. Firms will respond by trying to smooth the creation of jobs over time and
business  cycles, and falls in demand in a recession will be accommodated via an increase in
destruction  (by lowering the redundancy age) as well as lowering the creation flow
8.   In other
words, firms will make adjustments  on both margins leading to lower employment and contrary
effects  on average tenure. In the extreme, when the marginal creation cost is very high, firms will
set  a constant creation rate whilst accommodating the business cycle by varying redundancy age.
Empirically,  however, we would expect and indeed we find that firms appear to operate on both
margins.
Workplace age and job reallocation
We have argued that newer jobs are more productive and less likely to be made redundant.
Analogously,  younger firms will have a greater proportion of  new jobs and experience less
adjustment  through destruction (Caballero and Hammour, 1994; footnote 22). It would seem,
however,  that this outcome would depend on the nature of creation costs the firm is facing.
Empirically,  a negative relationship between the age of the  firm and job reallocation has been
established  in the literature (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1995). Caballero and Hammour add that their8
9We could expect this to be a sizable impact considering the multiple impacts on the destruction  flow of the fall
in  am and the substitution of  ä/a for  ä in the employment equation (A).
prediction could be considered more formally by assuming that the  exogenous destructive flow
due to attrition  äN(t) is made a decreasing function of  age,  ä(a). We  introduce the term  ä/a for
attrition as a simple example. Solving for the steady state provides:
(7a) c( f




















It  is perhaps not obvious from the above what difference this modification has made. As a
comparison,   we solve  (7) and (7a) for  am assuming  in both cases that r=0.065,  ä =0.15,   ã =0.028
and  c=0.5. We find that the obsolescence age falls from 7.2 years to 6.7 years if attrition falls with
age  according to  ä/a.  Substituting these values for  am into (8) and (8a) respectively, and assuming
that D=1, we find creation flows accordingly fall from 20%  to 15.8% in the steady state. If the
obsolescence  age and the creation flow have both fallen, employment will fall. We expect,
therefore  to find a negative relationship between workplace age and net employment change, the
impact  on gross employment change is not clear.
9 Similarly, a fall in the creation flow will increase
average job  tenure whilst a fall in the redundancy age will lower average tenure: the impact on
average tenure is also not clear.
Training
Caballero  and Hammour (1994) also briefly (in the conclusion) consider the possibility of a range
of productivity within a cohort  (perhaps reflecting differences in ability) and/or the existence of
a  learning curve so that units become wiser with age. These additions are, however, somewhat
ad hoc to their model. Aghion and Howitt (1994; 489) explicitly consider the possibility of
production  units steadily increasing their output throughout their lifetime if they engage in a
process of  learning-by-doing. They argue that a production unit could increase its productivity
according  to learning-by-doing by some rate (say at some constant proportional rate  ã1).  In terms
of the Caballero and Hammour  framework, the technology of a productive unit once created is
no  longer constant over its lifetime, rather, productivity will be related to the age of the unit   A(t0,
a),  where  A(t0,a) =  A(t0)exp(ã0+ 1a).  If the overall growth in technology incorporates this learning-
by-doing  effect then  ã=ã0+ã1a where  ã0 ,ã1,ã1' > 0. This will impact on the steady state condition:9
10 If  we consider the case where  ã 0=0.025  and  ã 1=0.003,  so that the total growth rate  ã  remains at 0.028  ceteris
paribus,  and compare our results with the standard model, (7) and (8), we find larger effects of the same direction:
the obsolescence age rises (from 7.2 to 8.8 years) and the creation flow  falls (from 20.1 to 17.9%).
(7b) c( f
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If  we consider the case where training adds to total growth, for example  ã 0=0.028  and
ã 1=0.003    ceteris paribus,  and compare our results with the standard model, (7) and (8), we find
that  the obsolescence age has risen (from 7.2 to 7.7 years) and the creation flow has fallen (from
20.1  to 18.96%).
10  If the obsolescence age has risen, destruction has fallen and net employment
will  rise. A fall in the creation flow will, however, lead to a fall in net employment. It is not clear
which  of these effects will dominate. The fall in creation flow and increase in the redundancy age
will  both lead to longer average job tenure, however. We will consider the relationship between
measures of the  impact of training, average tenure and employment changes in section 4 below.
An  alternative view of the impact of training is presented in Mortensen and Pissarides
(1995),  they argue that firms can take an alternative option to destroying an unprofitable job and
creating an entirely new job. Firms can keep their otherwise obsolete worker by   retraining and
combining  with current capital to form a new production unit. In so doing, the firm can save itself
the  costs and uncertainties involved in the hiring process. (It may also gain by keeping the
learning-by-doing  productivity bonus inherent in longer tenured employees discussed above.) It
could  be argued that this is a simple result that merely arises from the definition of job creation
used  in the model. It is true that in both the Caballero and Hammour (1994) and Aghion and
Howitt  (1994) models the possibility of combining an old worker with new technology is not
allowed  for, and it would be a very simple process to incorporate this possibility within the
Caballero  and Hammour framework. Indeed, the retrained worker is actually occupying a new job
with  a new capital endowment and state-of-the-art technology and his/her previous job has been
destroyed.  Since this process of reallocation occurred within the same firm, however, employment
levels have not changed. In the longer run,  these firms can extract a larger return from an initial
hire  outside of the firm: they can create further jobs at a lower cost because they can retrain and
make  use of their incumbent workforce. As discussed previously, lowering the cost of creation
will lead to a fall in the obsolescence age (lowering net employment) but an increase in  job10
creation  (raising net employment). Note, the impact of training is slightly different if it acts to
increase  the productivity of the production unit (discussed above) than if it acts via lowering the
creation  cost.  With an increase in productivity the redundancy age will rise and creation flow will
fall  (increasing average tenure), the opposite happens with a fall in creation costs (decreasing job
average  tenure), whilst both result in offsetting effects on total employment. We will explore the
alternative relationships with training in the results section below.
It might seem that it  would always be cheaper for a firm to retrain an incumbent worker
than  to seek and train a new employee from outside. This is not necessarily true, for example, if
the  job required skills of a general nature, the employer may prefer an outside candidate who has
re cently finished an education programme with more current skills. Alternatively, if the job
required  high levels of job-specific training (such as may occur if the firm used a capital intensive
production  process) the value of a successful match would be more important and the firm would
be  less willing to part with an incumbent (we also argue that a young workforce,  ceteris paribus,
will  have less job-specific training). A third scenario may occur  if  the human capital component
of  the job is very little, in which case the firm could again save hiring costs by keeping an
employee  providing they had a similar opening to slot them in to. We could also expect large firms
(with  more openings at any point in time) to be more able to accommodate in this way and have
less  creation costs. We consider the relationship between measures of employee skills, capital
intensity, young workforce, and workplace size for employment change and average  job tenure
and  investigate the importance of these issues in section four of the paper, 
Wage changes
Caballero  and Hammour (1994) assume a constant consumption wage, implying that newer
workers  do not receive higher wages and that workers do not have bargaining strength over
wages.  The first is an intuitively unappealing assumption given that all workers from the same
cohort  have equal productivity and see their relative productivity fall at the same rate,  ã,  compared
to  newer cohorts. Indeed, both Aghion and Howitt (1994) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1995)
allow  for the wages of more recent units to rise over time. Relative wage changes play an
important part in the reallocation process in the general equilibrium models:  workers are aware
that  they can earn more by being hired in a new production unit, they are therefore constantly
seeking a new appointment. If  firms do not raise the wages of their incumbent employees, they
wil l lose these members of their workforce. This means that the wages of incumbent workers11
increase even though their productivity is set at the time  of creation. The increase in wages will
eat  into the operating surplus causing the value of the job to depreciate at a faster rate and
decreasing  the obsolescence age. Whilst Caballero and Hammour do not discuss wage increases,
their  exogenous destruction rate  ä can encompass this effect. We can consider this impact in (4')
below:




ð ( s&t, t) e &( r%ä ) ( s&t) %bsds
The  integrand has changed between 4 and 4' due to the introduction of the factor  e
bs which
captures the depreciation due to wage movements. Solving for the steady state provides:
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If  we assume that wages increase by 1% per annum (b=0.01) and we maintain all the assumptions
we  have previously made about the remaining parameters, we find that (compared to the standard
model  as expressed in (7) and (8))  am(t) falls from 7.22 years to 5.9 years whilst  f(0,t) rises from
20.1%  to 22.4%. These will once again have offsetting effects on employment change, an increase
in  the wage will lower the obsolescence age, increasing destruction and decreasing net
employment  whilst an increase in the creation rate increases net employment. Both of these effects
will lead to lower levels of average job tenure. We consider the relationship between relative
wages and employment changes in section 4 below. 
Bargaining strength
Worke rs and firms may also share the operating surplus according to their relative bargaining
strength  â:




ð ( s&t, t) e &( r%ä ) ( s&t) ds
If  workers have no bargaining strength,  â = 1 and equations 4 and 4'' are equivalent. As the
worker’s  bargaining strength increases, however, the period of profitable employment  needs to
rise  in order to justify the original expenditure on creation. As  â falls from 1 to 0.75 to 0.5,
obsol escence age rises from 7.2 to 8.6 to 11 years and the creation flow falls from 20.1% to12
11 A more commonly used growth measure ( G)  is the change in the variable over time divided by the lagged value
of  the variable,  G and the measure used here ( g)  can be easily compared since  G/ 2g/(2-g).  Thus when we consider
a  workplace growth rate of  g = 0.15 this corresponds to the more standard measure of  G = 0.1622, or some 16%.
17.9%  to 15.2%.  This is again an offsetting effect on employment change, union bargaining
strength  is positively related to a rise in obsolescence age ( more employment and longer tenure)
whilst  negatively related to job creation (less employment but greater average tenure). We explore
this  relationship in section 4 below using two indicators of relative bargaining strength which we
believe  to be related to  â:  union recognition and competition in the product market (Mumford and
Dowrick,  1994). We expect that union recognition in a workplace would lead to a lower level of
â.  Similarly, firms who face little competition may be less responsive to market pressures,
resulting  in lower level of  â.  We consider this relationship in the results section after first
establishing some basic features of the gross job flows data in section 3 below. 
   III.  The size of the gross job flows
In  this section of the paper we seek to establish some basic facts about the extent of job creation
and  job destruction occurring at surviving workplaces in Australia between September 1988 and
September  1989. To establish comparability of this data with that used for other countries, the
approach  used here follows that proposed by Davis and Haltiwanger (1990 and 1992)
investigating  gross job flows in US manufacturing and is comparable to recent applications to the
UK (Konings, 1995) and to a range of European countries (Burda and Wyplosz, 1994). As in
Davis  and Haltiwanger (1992), the size of an establishment  e at time  t is the average of the
reported  employment levels  n in that establishment at time  t and  t-1 and is denoted  by  xet=( nt +
nt-1)/2.  The growth rate for this establishment at time  t ( get)  is the difference in employment levels
at  the establishment between  t and  t-1 divided by  xet.  Thus,  get=( nt - nt-1) / xet. Using the average
employment change in the denominator binds  get to lay between -2 (a death) and +2 (a birth)
11 .
We use data generated by the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (AWIRS)
which  interviewed some 2000 workplaces, with more than 20 employees, across all industries
(excluding  agriculture and defence), in September 1989. Respondents were asked for current
employment  information in September 1989 and for retrospective employment information of
September 1988. 
Figure  1 represents the weighted growth rate distribution for the 1678 workplaces in our13
data  set, where the weights are the inverses of the sampling probability. The distribution is slightly
asymmetric  with the central peak laying just to the right of zero, as we would expect for a period
of  job growth. The bulk of workplaces lay close to the centre, indeed 75.8% of workplaces had
growth  rates which lay in the interval -0.15 to 0.15 and 42.3% lay between -0.05 and 0.05. This
suggests  that the vast majority of job reallocation and worker turnover is taking place in those
workplaces  experiencing only moderate changes in growth rates. If we concentrate on
manufacturing, we find 36.9% lie between -0.05 and 0.05,  with 70.8% lying between -0.15 and
0.15.  The results are similar to those established for US manufacturing by Haltiwanger and Davis
(1992) who found 29% and 63% respectively. 
For  this comparison the data set is limited by only considering workplaces still in existence
on  the interview date and thereby ignoring births and deaths. Comparing the original ABS list of
possible  participants with those selected for the survey suggests a simple death rate of 5.94%.
Unfortunately,  we cannot be more specific about the distribution of these deaths across industries
nor  about the size of the workforces involved and so cannot calculate a weighted death rate.
Ignoring  workplaces that have died will lead to an underestimate of job destruction, our measure
should  therefore be considered as a lower bound. The data set also provides inadequate
information about  new workplaces (less than one year old) and so will underestimate births and
the  true extent of job creation. It is possible, however,  to make some allowances for births. The
most  extreme allowance we can make is to include all those workplaces with a missing
observation  for employment in 1988 and a positive employment level for 1989 as a birth (ie., set
the  employment level for 1988 equal to zero). This assumption increases the total number of
observations by 69, from 1678 to 1747: births have increased substantially from 0.4% of all
workplaces  to 4.8%. We believe that this assumption will over predict the number of births in the
economy  as many of these missing observations are simply that. Nevertheless, the true gross flow
measurement  will sit between the adjusted and unadjusted series. Even with the extreme
assumption,  however, the percentage measure of workplaces laying in the intervals discussed
above changes very little (40.5% lay between -0.05 and 0.05 and  75.8% lay between -0.15 and
0.15).  These results support our conclusion that the majority of job turnover is taking place in
surviving firms who are experiencing modest changes in their growth rates.
We can move readily from the measures of growth rates discussed above to consider gross
job  reallocation. Following Haltiwanger and Davis (1992), the gross job creation rate at time t14
12 We would also expect  measures generated from ABS data to differ from those from the AWIRS data  set we used
because the latter does not consider workplaces  with less the 20 employees. Our theoretical discussion suggests
that  small workplaces will be associated with higher job reallocation and thus that the ABS measures would be
higher.  We will explore the relationship between workplace size and employment change more fully in section 4
of the paper.
( post)  is the sum of the growth rates (or employment gains) at expanding or new workplaces
divided by sector size (and  suitably weighted), and vice versa for the gross job destruction rate
( negt).  The total reallocation of jobs in the economy ( gross)  is the sum of job creation and the
absolute  value of job destruction, whilst the net change ( net) is the sum of creation and
destruction.  Table 1 lists these rates for the unadjusted and adjusted series by industry and total.
The  final column records the net employment change by industry for the Australian economy
according  to the ABS. Thus, considering the total values (the final row on the table), the
unadjusted  data suggests that there was an increase in the body of jobs due to job creation of
6.3%  whilst simultaneously 5.2% of jobs were destroyed, this implies that 11.5% of jobs change
and  that after adjusting to accommodate these changes the economy's workforce increased by
1.1%.  The adjusted series provides substantially larger measures of job creation (10.1%), total
reallocation (15.2%) and  net employment change (5%). The latter value sits much closer to the
ABS  calculation of a net employment growth rate of 5.6% for this time period, however, due to
the lack of deaths in our data we believe these values to be overestimated
12 . 
Konings and Pissarides (1994) provide a comparison of job reallocation rates for the
manufacturing  sector in a range of different countries, they find (ignoring births and deaths)  gross
reallocation rates of about 15% per annum in North America  and 10% in the EU. Our result of
11.4%  reallocation in manufacturing (with no adjustments made for births) suggests that Australia
sits  in between Europe and North America, although it is closer to the former than the latter. This
result  is confirmed by comparing the gross reallocation rate calculated from WIRS for
manufacturing  in the UK in 1990 (without adjustment) of 9.8% (Konings and Pissarides, 1994;5).
We also find substantial variation across industries using both the adjusted and unadjusted
series,  with all industries showing substantial simultaneous job creation and destruction. Studies
of  job reallocation outside of manufacturing are rare, however, Anderson and Meyer (1994;220)
provide  reallocation rates for a range of American states by industry groupings. They also find
substantial  variation in simultaneous job creation and destruction across industries. There are
some  major definitional differences across the two studies, for example agriculture is not included15
in  the Australian data. The source of their data set is also very different; they use data from 1978
to  1984 collected from unemployment insurance records. Nevertheless, considering the industries
included  in both studies, the gross job reallocation ranking by industry is surprisingly similar (with
construction  and wholesale and retail trade all showing strong reallocation rates in both studies).
Furthermore, manufacturing  has comparatively low gross reallocation rates in both studies (7th
out of 11 industries in Australia and 6th out of 10 industries in the US).
It  is also useful to consider the extent of job reallocation relative to worker reallocation.
Our  aggregate adjusted job reallocation rates  (total row, Table 1) reveal that 15.2% of jobs were
either  created or destroyed between the accounting periods of September 1988 to September
1989  in Australia.  At a minimum, we would expect an increase in the number of workers to fill
the net 5% growth in jobs, in fact worker reallocation rates are much higher than this since
workers  obviously change jobs and employment status for many reasons besides just demand from
firms.  Following Davis and Haltiwanger (1992 and 1995) a measure of worker reallocation can
be  constructed from the sum of (a) those people who have job tenure of 12 months or less in
September  1989 and (b) those people unemployed in September 1989 who were employed in
September  1988, both as a proportion of employment.  This measure captures those people who
have  been in obvious transition in the previous 12 months. These values for worker reallocation
are (a) 27.9%,  (b) 5%, and a total of 32.9% for Australia (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992, found
28.2%,  8.6% and 36.8% respectively for a typical year in the US between 1968 and 1987).
Dividing  gross job reallocation by worker reallocation provides the proportion of worker
movements  linked to changes in the employment patterns of workplaces. Thus, gross job
reallocation  is associated with some 46.2% of  worker reallocation in Australia (Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992, found a similar upper limit of 56%).
IV.  Explaining job reallocation and average job tenure
In  this section of the paper we investigate the determination of differences in job reallocation and
average  job tenure across workplaces in Australia. To truly capture job reallocation we would like
to  measure simultaneous job creation and destruction at a workplace. We do not have these data,
instead  we can measure total net employment growth at a workplace (this captures the directional
effect  of demand changes predicted in our earlier discussion) or the absolute change in
employment  at a workplace (this measure effectively captures relative changes in reallocation) as
measures of  job  reallocation. In the first case, we measure the difference between job creation16
13 Thus we are not using the bounded measure used by Haltiwanger and Davis (1992) and in our Figure 1.
and  job destruction; in the second, the sum of absolute creation and destruction. In addition, we
have  a measure of the average tenure of employees at a given workplace for which our model
generates predictions.
Table  2 presents our estimation results. In columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is the
net  employment growth rate which is defined as the change in the logarithm of employment
occurring in a workplace between September 1988 and September 1989
13  . We consider only
continuing  workplaces over this time period. In columns 3 and 4, the dependent variable is the
absolute  change in the logarithm of employment. In columns 5 and 6, the logarithm of average
tenur e is the dependent variable. Estimation is by generalised least squares and coefficient
standard  errors are calculated to be robust to heteroscedasticity in the equation error of an
unknown  form. Each of the first four models explains about 10 to 12% of the variation in net and
5  to 7% of  absolute log employment change which, although small, is representative of this type
of  equation. We explain about 37% of the variation in log average tenure which is large given that
we only model  the demand side of the tenure decision. Encouragingly, the coefficients all have
the  signs suggested in our theoretical discussion (section 2, above) and we discuss them in turn
below. 
The  fundamental relationship predicted by the Caballero and Hammour (1984) model is
that  an increase in the demand for a firm’s output will lead to positive employment growth  whilst
a  decrease in demand of the same size will lead to a stronger fall in employment. We investigate
this  prediction by including two binary variables:  demand up and  demand down. Respondents
were asked if ‘the  demand for your workplace’s main product or service is expanding, stable or
contracting’. Demand  up was coded to be 1 if the response was expanding and zero otherwise,
similarly demand down was -1 for  contracting and zero otherwise. Examining columns 1 and 2,
our  results support the idea of asymmetry, we find significant contrary effects of demand
expectations  on employment growth, we also find that the effect of a fall in demand is significantly
larger  than the impact of  a rise in demand. According to columns 5 and 6, increased demand leads
to  reduced average tenure (although not very significantly). In terms of our model this implies that
a  substantial amount of the employment increase is achieved by increasing the creation flow.
Downward  adjustment of employment is also importantly generated by reducing the creation flow17
according  to our results. The three sets of estimates, taken together, suggest that employment
adjustment  is achieved by both changing the creation flow and the obsolescence age (implying that
there  is an increasing relationship between the creation costs and the creation flow rate): the
adjustment  of the creation flow is proportionally large enough to determine changes in the average
tenure.
Our second major hypothesis  was that workplace age would have a negative impact on
net  employment growth, which is also supported by our results (where workplace  age is  a discrete
6  valued variable measured at the midpoints of each time period). The model solution in section
2  suggests that higher workplace age would be associated with reduced job creation and higher
job  destruction, thus reducing net employment growth. The effect on absolute employment change
depends  on the relative size of these two changes. Our results in column 3 show that the impact
on  reduced job creation is the greater. This is confirmed by the positive impact of age on average
tenure  in column 5. We investigate the structure of the impact of workplace age in more detail
in  columns 2, 4 and 6 by using dummy variables for age bands. Relative to a medium-aged
workplace  of 10-20 years (the missing category), we find that very young (age less than 2 years)
workplaces  experience substantially more net employment change. This is mirrored, although less
significantly, in absolute change. Average tenure is substantially higher in workplaces over 10
years  old. The effects on tenure proposed in our model are probably reinforced by institutional
features such as well-developed industrial relations procedures in older firms.
The  impact of training on employment change is captured by the variable   new training
(coded  1 if new training programmes  have been introduced in the workplace, and 0 otherwise).
Discussion  of the effect of training in section 2 above concerns two alternative explanations. Both
the  learning-by-doing and the reduced creation cost arguments predicted offsetting impacts of
training  on employment growth. They have distinct predictions, however,  for the impact on
absolute  employment change. We find a significant positive impact on net employment, suggesting
that  either the negative effect on the creation flow is outweighed by the positive impact on
obsolescence  age as suggested by the learning-by-doing approach or that the positive effect on
the  creation flow outweighs the negative impact on outflows as suggested by the reduced-creation
cost  argument. Firms who introduce training increase employment by 4%  ceteris paribus.  The
effect  of training on absolute employment change is downwards according to the learning-by-
doi ng approach and upwards according to the reduced creation cost argument. The results in18
14 An  alternative explanation for the impact of competition is provided in Davis and Haltiwanger (1992 and 1994)
where  it is argued that plants may acquire information about their efficiency level in a passive manner over a
lengthy period of  production. Plants that accumulate favourable information prosper and grow, plants acquiring
unfavourable  information may merely exist at their current size or exit. Gross job turnover can be seen as a means
of adjusting to this  information as the plant acquires it. A variant on this theme involves plants actively seeking
information  and attempting to affect their survival likelihood by engaging in investment. A firm who chooses
wisely   ex poste compared to its competitors will survive.  Incorrect choices will lead to exit. The degree of
competition faced by the firm will therefore have a negative relationship with  gross job turnover. A third group
of  theories concentrates on the role that shocks can play resulting in substantial changes in the production process
and  perhaps the skill requirement of the workforce. Less exposed firms will have less reallocation, factors that can
cushion a firm include limited competition and greater information of its efficiency levels.
columns  3 and 4 support the learning-by-doing approach. The average tenure results also support
the  learning-by-doing approach by suggesting that training increases tenure, although both results
are at modest levels of significance.
We argue above that relative wage change would have contrary effects on net employment
change.  We include a measure of the relative non-managerial wage of a workplace compared to
other  workplaces in the industry (a 5 valued discrete variable symmetrically coded around 0,  rel
wage).  This wage measure is found to have a significant positive effect on workplace employment
growth,  suggesting creation is more substantially increased than destruction. Absolute
employment  change and average tenure are also significantly positively affected. The positive
effect  of the relative wage on average tenure is not consistent with our model, although it clearly
is  with models explaining employee labour supply decisions (Killingsworth, 1983) and on-the-job
search activity (Mortensen, 1986).  
The  impact of bargaining over the firms’ surplus on employment change is modelled
through  measures of union activity and product market competition.  Union recognition (a binary
variable coded 0 if the workplace is not unionised and 1 if it is) and the level of   competition  (a
discrete 3  valued variable for none=3, few=2, or many=1 competitors) facing the workplace in
the  output market were included to reflect relative bargaining strength. In the presence of union
recognition,  the firm’s relative bargaining strength,  â,  would fall and  vice versa with increased
product  market competition 
14 .  We expect changes in  â to have contrary impacts on employment
growth  as was discussed above. In columns 1 and 2 we find negative impacts for competition and
union  recognition although these are not very significant. This is not very surprising given
previous  empirical evidence for the UK in Blanchflower and Burgess (1996).  The impact of these
two  variables on absolute employment change is also negative, reflecting the prediction from
section  2 that both job creation and job destruction will fall as the bargaining strength of firms is19
reduced. The impact on average tenure is positive and significant in the case of product market
competition,  also in line with the prediction of our model. Increased bargaining strength of unions
increases average tenure.
We examine whether the introduction of new technology  per se has the effect of increasing
the  rate of employment change. (The variable  new tech is a binary variable coded 1 if new
technology  has been introduced and 0 otherwise.) The evidence from our results is that the
introduction  of new technology raises absolute employment change and, consistently, reduces
average job tenure, the latter being a more significant effect.
 
Our  empirical model also includes a number of additional control variables. They are
industry  dummies (for the 2 digit industry definition),  labour intensity (a discrete 6 valued variable
measuring  labour costs as a percentage of total costs), workplace  size (a discrete 6 valued variable
measuring  number of employees in September 1998),  skill requirements (a 3 valued discrete
variable  coded 1 if skill requirements have increased, -1 if decreased, and 0 if not changed), and
inexperience (a discrete 5 valued variable measuring the proportion of the workforce who are
under 20 years of age).
Our  measure of labour intensity is an inverse measure of capital intensity. Previous studies
have  found that industries  with high levels of capital intensity are associated with lower levels of
job  reallocation (Contini and Revelli, 1992). Our results for absolute employment change are
consistent  with these observations. We find labour intensity reduces net employment change
thereby increasing average  tenure. The standard results in the literature are that workplace size
is  associated with lower levels of job reallocation. Our results are in accordance with these
findings and significantly so. We find  a negative  relationship between workplace size and both
net  and absolute employment growth.  Average tenure is increased by the reduction in the creation
flow  and the increase in the obsolescence age that the employment growth results suggest. The
skill  measure is found to have a positive impact on employment growth as we would expect from
the  theory discussed above and is in accordance with findings from other studies (Davis and
Haltiwanger,  1994). Finally, we find that a more inexperienced workforce is associated with less
net  employment growth but more absolute employment change. The second of the two results is
in  line with the observations of Davis and Haltiwanger (1994) and others. Both skill change and
a  more inexperienced workforce reduce average tenure according to the results in columns 5 and20
6.  In the first case, this is consistent with increased creation flow and in the second with reduced
obsolescence age. These are the dominant influences of the employment change results.
The  estimation results we present can be judged on two levels. First, they provide a more
comprehensive  multivariate analysis of three aspects of employment dynamics: net and gross
employment  change and average job tenure. Second, more importantly, they provide an empirical
implementation  of the extended model discussed in section 2. The model provides predictions for
the  determinants of all three aspects of employment dynamics. The almost complete consistency
of  these predictions with the three sets of empirical results provides a good degree of support for
the  key predictions of the model. The estimation results also provide a means of assessing the
importance  of specific features of the model such as the determination of job creation costs. The
asymmetric  impact of demand changes on net employment  confirms that creation costs are a
function  of the job creation rate. The impact of demand shocks on average tenure confirms, in
addition,  that much  adjustment takes place on the creation flow margin providing a positive lower
bound between creation costs and the job creation rate.
V.  Conclusions
This  paper is concerned with the determinants of job reallocation and average job tenure. Analysis
of  a single panel of workplace data (AWIRS) demonstrates that simultaneous job creation and
destruction  is an important feature of the Australian labour market. We present measures of  job
reallocation  across industries in Australia and provide comparisons of these flows with those
calculated  for studies from other countries. We find that in a year of strong employment growth
across  the country (some 5%), 5% of jobs were destroyed and 10% created. These results suggest
that  the gross job flow rate in Australia is higher than that experienced in the UK but lower than
that  in North America. The majority of this job reallocation was found to be taking place in
workplaces  that are  experiencing moderate growth rates, in accordance to the findings of other
international  studies. If job reallocation is considered as a proportion of total worker reallocation,
we  can argue that some 46% of  the  worker reallocation in Australia between September 1988
and September 1989 was associated with workplace job reallocation.
In this paper, we extend two major  strands in the literature: the theoretical work on job
creation  and destruction; and the evidence on three aspects of employment dynamics (net and
gross employment changes and  average job tenure) by implementing an extended version of the21
Caballero  and Hammour (1994) model on workplace data.  We present results which provide
clear  evidence as to the nature of workplaces in which job reallocation is concentrated. Our
regression  results support the major prediction of the model: we find that employment growth is
asymmetrically  related to expected changes in demand for the output of the workplace; falls in
demand  have a negative impact which is substantially larger than the positive impact of increases
in  demand on employment growth. We also find that the absolute change in employment is lower
for  workplaces that are larger, older, more capital intensive or operating in a less competitive
environment.  Changes in skill requirements and relative wages are found to have a positive effect
on  job reallocation. We found the impacts on average tenure (except in the case of relative wages)
are  as expected from the model and from these changes in employment. Whilst some of the
individual  coefficients are only modestly significant, overall there is a substantial degree of
agreement  between the predictions of the model and our empirical results. Indeed, given our
concentration  solely on the firms demand for employees, the success of our empirical explanation
for average  job tenure is surprising. We know that changes in the firms demands for employees
captures  less than half of the total worker flows for Australia, we might expect to only be able to
explain  tenure to a similar degree as our other measures of employment dynamics. Our finding of
a  positive relationship between tenure and relative wages clearly suggests that the individual
labour supply decisions of employees also need to be addressed within this framework.
There  is a limit to the amount of heterogeneity in workplace job reallocation which partial
equilibrium can be expected to explain. There is a another avenue for future studies to improve
upon  this work by further considering the causes of this heterogeneity. In particular, there is much
scope to consider  workforce heterogeneity and, for example, the possibility of self selection by
low productivity employees for high turnover workplaces.22
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Table 1.  Gross job flows, 1988-89.
                                                                                                                
       no adjustment             with max adjustment      ABS
industrypos neg gross net pos neg gross net net
                                                                                                                
mining 12.1-1.914.010.2 13.6-1.915.511.7 10.1
manufact6.3 -5.111.41.2 7.9 -5.013.02.9 2.7
elec, gas
& water 2.3 -5.37.6 -2.9 2.3 -5.37.6 -2.9 -0.4
construct 9.3 -6.615.72.7 11.5-6.417.95.2 12.7
wholesale &
retail trade 7.1 -7.814.9-0.7 11.3-7.618.93.7  6.7
transport &
storage 12.0-3.915.98.1 14.0-3.917.910.2 7.2
communic4.4 -2.46.8 2.0 6.7 -2.49.1 4.3 3.6
finance &
business7.8 -5.913.71.8 12.7-5.818.56.9 8.3
public 
admin 3.7 -4.48.1 -0.7 7.7 -4.312.03.4 0.4
community 
service 4.7 -2.97.5 1.8 11.1-2.813.98.4 3.6
rec & pers
services6.5 -12.0 18.5-5.5 12.2-11.6 23.80.5  4.5
total 6.3 -5.211.51.1 10.1   -5.1 15.25.0 5.624
Table 2.  Employment dynamics, 1988-89.
                                                                                                                
log employment 
change                    net                    absolute                     log ave tenure            
                                        (1) (2) (3)  (4)     (5) (6)
constant 0.09       0.04  0.07  0.08       1.61 1.71 
(1.59)  
   (0.61)  (1.51)     (1.53)   (11.54)
** (12.41)
**
demand up 0.039 0.040 -0.01 -0.01        -0.06 -0.04
(2.07)
** (2.09)
**   (0.73) (0.71)     (1.44) (1.09)




   (0.10)     (0.71) (0.88)
age     -0.001 -0.001   0.005
(1.50)  (1.36)      (5.06)
**
age <2 0.24 0.13 -0.0003
(1.99)
** (1.15) (0.002)
age 2-5 0.03 -0.04 -0.26
(0.08) (1.58) (3.13)
**








age >50 0.01 -0.01 0.18
(0.56) (0.50) (3.34)
**
new train 0.04  0.04     -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.05
(2.28)
** (2.30)
** (0.44) (0.43).  (1.29) (1.43)





**    (1.98)
**       (2.09)
**
union recognition -0.03 -0.03  -0.02  -0.03      0.02 0.003
(0.94)(0.97)  (0.75)(0.88)   (0.39) (0.06)
competition -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01      0.08 0.07
(0.43)(0.38) (0.44) (0.35)     (2.21)
** (2.02)
**
tech introd. -0.0030.002 0.02 0.02      -0.06 -0.07
(0.19)
   (0.09) (1.13) (1.22)     (1.66)
* (1.92)
*
labour intensity   -0.01 -0.04 0.10  0.08       0.06 0.07
(0.23)(1.02) (2.35)
** (2.09)
**      (0.68) (0.69)
size  -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01      0.05  0.05
(3.12)
**   (2.95)
**   (1.24) (0.96)     (3.39)
** (3.51)
**




        (0.91) (0.91)










2 0.10010.1238 0.0530 0.0679      0.3607 0.3712
No. obs  613 615 613 615 604 605
 Estimation method: GLS. Industry dummies included. Heteroscedasticity robust absolute t-values in parentheses.
**  denotes significance at the 95% level; 
* 90% level.25
                     Figure 1.  Workplace growth rates.26
Table 2old.  Employment dynamics, 1988-89.
                                                                                                                
employment 
change (%)         net                        absolute              ave tenure
                                        (1) (2) (3)  (4)     (5)
constant 9.88    10.11 10.66 11.65      6.19
(2.06)
**  
   (0.20)
**   (0.20)
**    (0.19)
**      (0.02)
**
demand up 4.41  4.46 0.04 0.58       -0.28
(0.07)
** (0.07)
**   (0.06)
** (0.06)
**      (0.005)
**




   (0.06)
**      (0.008)
**
tech introd. 0.41 1.90      -0.35
(0.06)
**   (0.05)
**        (0.005)
**





**      (0.0001)
**





** .  (0.005)
**





**    (0.003)
**      





**    (0.007)
**





**      (0.005)
**





**      (0.01)
**
size/100  -0.67 -0.66 -0.16 -0.11      0.08 
(0.004)
**   (0.004)
**   (0.004)
** (0.003)
**      (0.0006)
**





**         (0.004)
**









2 0.054 0.056 0.03 0.03       0.31
No. obs  613 613 613 613 604
 
Estimation  method: GLS. Industry dummies included. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
**  denotes significance at the 95% level; 
* 90% level.27